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Detecting and Defeating 
Advanced Man-In-The-
Middle Attacks against TLS
Abstract: TLS is an essential building block for virtual private networks. A critical aspect for 
the security of TLS dialogs is authentication and key exchange, usually performed by means of 
certifi cates. An insecure key exchange can lead to a man-in-the-middle attack (MITM). Trust in 
certifi cates is generally achieved using Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), which employ trusted 
certifi cate authorities (CAs) to establish certifi cate validity chains. 
In the last years, a number of security concerns regarding PKI usage have arisen: certifi cates 
can be issued for entities in the Internet, regardless of its position in the CA hierarchy tree. This 
means that successful attacks on CAs have the potential to generate valid certifi cates enabling 
man-in-the-middle attacks. The possibility of malicious use of intermediate CAs to perform 
targeted attacks through ad-hoc certifi cates cannot be neglected and are extremely diffi cult to 
detect. 
Current PKI infrastructure for TLS is prone to MITM attacks, and new mechanisms for 
detection and avoidance of those attacks are needed. IETF and other standardization bodies 
have launched several initiatives to enable the detection of “forged” certifi cates. Most of these 
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1. INTRODUCTION
TLS [1] is an essential building block for securing virtually every application layer protocol 
and has also been successfully used to secure virtual private networks. A critical aspect for the 
security of any TLS dialog is authentication and key exchange, usually performed by means of 
X.509 certifi cates. An insecure key exchange can lead to an active third party (i.e. an attacker) 
being able not only to eavesdrop, but also to intercept and insert traffi c in the communication 
in order to alter the setup process for the secure channel inserting himself effectively “in-the-
middle” of the communication, thus hindering confi dentiality and integrity. 
Ideally, key exchange should only occur when there is certainty about the authenticity of the 
certifi cates involved. Trust in certifi cates is generally achieved using Public Key Infrastructures 
(PKIs), which rely on trusted third parties (called certifi cate authorities, CAs) to establish 
certifi cate validity chains [2], which are called certifi cation paths. A communicating party 
assumes a certifi cate as authentic if the signature of the certifi cate can be traced back through a 
valid certifi cation path up to a trusted CA. This method for validating certifi cates is the de facto 
standard in the Internet, and has been regarded as secure for decades. 
Although the Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 Certifi cates (PKIX) [2] is meant to avoid 
the occurrence of man-in-the-middle attacks on TLS, recent incidents have clearly shown the 
weaknesses of the classical PKI model. The public CA model allows any trusted CA to issue a 
certifi cate for any domain name.  A single trusted CA that betrays this trust, either voluntarily or 
by being compromised, can undermine the security provided by any certifi cates used in TLS just 
by issuing a replacement certifi cate that contains a rogue key, that is, a key not corresponding 
to the entity identifi ed in the certifi cate.  
A number of security concerns regarding PKIX usage have arisen in the last years, and it is 
foreseen that more incidents are likely to occur in the following years [3]. A certifi cate authority 
can issue certifi cates for any entity of the Internet, regardless of its position in the CA hierarchy 
initiatives attempt to solve the existing problems by maintaining the current PKI model and 
using certifi cate pinning, which associates certifi cates and servers on use. These techniques 
have signifi cant limitations, such as the need of a secure bootstrap procedure, or pinning 
requiring some host-by-host basis.
This study proposes an evolution from pinning-in-the-host to pinning-in-the-net, by enabling 
mechanisms to validate certifi cates as they travel through a given network. Certifi cates would 
be classifi ed as trusted or not trusted as a result of cross-information obtained from different 
sources. This would result in early detection of suspicious certifi cates and would trigger 
mechanisms to defeat the attack; minimize its impact; and gather information on the attackers. 
Additionally, a more detailed and thorough analysis could be performed. 
Keywords: certifi cate-pinning schemes, MITM attacks retaliation, SDN, OpenFlow
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tree. A Spanish CA, for instance, can issue a certifi cate for a US government website, and vice 
versa. This was coherent with the decentralized nature of the Internet (avoiding single points 
of failure), but has turned instead into an “any-point-of-failure” problem. A successful attack 
on any CA in the hierarchy allows the attacker to generate valid certifi cates for any host in 
the Internet which will be blindly accepted by most users, browsers and Internet applications, 
thus enabling effective man-in-the-middle attacks. These attacks are not theoretical, but have 
been found in the real world. Comodo CA issued in 2011 certifi cates for major websites such 
as Google, Yahoo, Mozilla and Skype to an Iranian hacker [4]. The DigiNotar CA in the 
Netherlands was also removed as a trusted CA in most major browsers after issuing a Google 
certifi cate to a third party. Whether these incidents are the result of sophisticated attacks or 
poor security policies is irrelevant. The fact is that countries cannot just rely on the security 
of their own PKI infrastructures (or that of their allies). NATO can usually audit its own CA 
infrastructures and ensure their security. However, security breaches in an external CA can also 
jeopardize NATO own security. In addition, the possibility of malicious use of intermediate 
CAs to perform targeted attacks through ad-hoc certifi cates cannot be neglected [5], and these 
attacks are extremely diffi cult to detect. These rogue certifi cates can be used in man-in-the-
middle attacks, which will not be detected by conventional mechanisms for PKIX certifi cation 
path validation and revocation checks.
2. RELATED WORK
Current PKIX infrastructure for TLS is prone to MITM attacks, which are usually consummated 
by the use of forged certifi cates or by manipulating certifi cate path validation. IETF and other 
standardization bodies have launched several initiatives to enable the detection of “forged” 
certifi cates. Most of the proposals focus on minimizing the impact of certifi cate misissuance 
while maintaining the current PKI model almost unchanged in order to ensure compatibility, 
usability and low-cost deployment. 
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [6] is a proposal to extend the secure 
DNS infrastructure DNSSEC [7] to store and sign keys and certifi cates which are used by 
TLS, so that clients can use this information to increase the level of assurance they receive 
from the TLS handshake process. Thanks to the use of DNSSEC, clients can verify that DNS 
information was provided by the domain operator and not tampered with while in transit. 
The rationale behind DANE is that given that the DNS administrator for a domain name is 
authorized to provide identifying information about his jurisdiction zone, he should be allowed 
to make an authoritative binding between the domain name and a certifi cate that might be used 
by a host at that domain name. According to this line of thinking, the proper place to hold this 
information is the DNS database, securing the binding with DNSSEC.
This binding is done by means of a certifi cate association. A security association is composed 
by the domain name where the server application runs and some information from the certifi cate 
used to identify this application.  A certifi cate association can also defi ne the combination of 
a trust anchor and a domain name. This certifi cate association is represented by the TLSA 
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DNS resource record [6], which is used to associate a TLS server certifi cate or public key 
with a domain name. DANE defi nes several use cases, which allows to apply this binding 
information either to End Entities (EE) or to defi ne new trust anchors that should be used to 
perform certifi cate path validation. A domain name administrator can even issue certifi cates for 
a domain without involving a third-party CA. A thorough description of DANE use cases can 
be found in [8].
Security associations are protected via DNSSEC. Taking into account that the deployment 
of DNSSEC infrastructure is still incomplete, any global proposal for certifi cate verifi cation 
cannot rest solely on DANE. Moreover, certifi cate validation procedures will use only PKIX 
checks when no DANE information is available. An active attacker who is able to divert 
user traffi c could block DANE traffi c, so that he can bypassed these additional verifi cations. 
Moreover, there are situations where DANE information could fail to get to the End Entity due 
to server errors or broken intermediaries that fi lter DNSSEC errors. Under these circumstances, 
the End Entity performing the validation could assume an attack is undergoing and terminate 
the connection, or it could dismiss the error and proceed.  The latter would mean that blocking 
DNSSEC traffi c could help to bypass the DANE-defi ned procedures. Thus, in order for 
DANE to be effectively used to prevent MITIM attacks, a deployment of DNSSEC in clients, 
servers, DNS infrastructure and intermediaries (i.e., to avoid DNSSEC information fi ltering) is 
required. Taking into account the traditional resilience of network operators and manufacturers, 
we cannot rely solely on DANE to provide the kind of path validation we are looking for in 
this work. Finally, the verifi cation of a key would require several DNSSEC queries that would 
introduce an undesired latency, unaffordable in some cases, e.g., SIP, XMPP.
In the short term, the basic technique that has been proposed to deal with this problem is known 
as certifi cate pinning, and relies on associating hosts with their expected X.509 certifi cates or 
public keys. Pinning is a way for clients to obtain a greater level of assurance in server public 
keys. By pinning a trusted known certifi cate (or public key), clients can detect any change 
either in the certifi cate or in the public key submitted by any server as part of any future TLS 
handshake. 
There are two main problems related to pinning techniques. The fi rst one is related to the process 
of bootstrapping the trust procedures, how we decide which associations are established. 
These associations can be set the fi rst encounter with the host in a Trust-On-First-Use basis 
(TOFU), or can be defi ned by a list that is shipped with the application. The second one is 
the need for maintenance of the secure associations database, which is the secure creation of 
new associations and the revocation of existing ones if needed. Currently, there the two main 
proposals for certifi cate pinning are the Trust Assertion for Certifi cate Keys (TACK) Internet 
Draft [9] and the Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP [10] promoted by Google.
In TACK, clients are allowed to pin to a server-chosen signing key (TACK signing key, TSK), 
which will be used to sign server’s TLS keys. Given that the actual TLS keys are not pinned, 
the site is able to deploy different certifi cates and keys on different servers, without having the 
clients to renew its pins. Also since pins are not based on CA keys, there is no need to trust in 
CAs. TACK also defi nes a mechanism to activate pins. As part of the TLS handshake, a client 
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could request a compliant TACK server to send its TSK public key and signature. Once a client 
has seen the same hostname-TSK pair multiple times, it could decide to activate a time-limited 
pin for that pair. By time-limiting the pins, the potential impact of a bad pinning decision is 
bounded. The specifi cation also mentions that pins could be aggregated and shared through a 
trusted third party but without defi ning either the infrastructure or the protocols required. This 
proposal, while promising, is still in a very early stage and accordingly not suitable for use in 
a production environment.
Public Key Pinning Extension (PKPE) for HTTP is conceptually quite similar to TACK but 
here the pins get delivered via a HTTP header and, accordingly, can only be applied to HTTP 
servers. This proposal defi nes a new HTTP header to enable a web host to tell browsers which 
public key should be present in the web host’s certifi cate in future TLS connections. We can 
see this as a way to bootstrap public key pinnings. Once pinned, when connecting to a web 
server, the client can easily do PKIX checks and also can verify that one of the pinned keys 
for that server is present. The main drawback of this and other similar pinning techniques is 
that they do not protect the user against man in the middle attacks during the fi rst connection 
attempt to the server. Also, such a MITM attack would not be detected until an update in the 
associations could be deployed to the hosts. This leaves an insecurity window that can be as 
long as one month in the PKPE case. To minimize this risk, a static list of pins is usually 
deployed with software packages. For instance, a total of 300 static pins are provided with the 
Google Chromium browser. 
Another proposed solution is the ‘sovereign keys’ project by the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
[11] (EFF). This solution that uses a “semi-centralized, verifi ably append-only data structure” 
containing the keys and revocations. These keys can only be added when it is strongly verifi ed 
that the domain belongs to the requesting party. A browser would, when connecting to a TLS 
service, lookup the certifi cate from this key-store. Similarly to Certifi cate Transparency the 
existence of an append-only log with all CA-issued certifi cates is assumed.
Finally, pinning techniques require some confi guration in a host-by-host basis and do not ship 
with a pre-established and well-defi ned mechanism for sharing pin information, even under 
the same domain. Currently very few sites publish pins, which limits the applicability of the 
proposal but it is expected that this situation will change in the near future, fuelled by the 
support by Google. Unfortunately, it is short-term solution and its scope is limited to HTTP so 
it is unable to help preventing MITM attacks against any other protocol secured by TLS.
The problem of verifying the authenticity of a given certifi cate can be affected by additional 
circumstances other than the presence of a rogue CA. For instance, a hostname can map 
to different servers, each with a different certifi cate and different CA chains, due to their 
dependence on different jurisdictions. Also, it is possible for a CA chain to change at any 
time, and this is out of the control of the administrators of the site. There is a proposal called 
certifi cate transparency [12], which tries to make the certifi cates that a certain CA has issued 
auditable and easy to track. This would make it easier for a site administrator to keep track of 
any new certifi cate issued for its site, usually a clear indication of a potential security breach. 
Participating entities should publish all certifi cates they issue so that clients could check 
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whether a certifi cate received by a server has a proof of publication. If the client is not able to 
obtain a cryptographic proof of publication, this could mean that the certifi cate has been forged. 
Note that this kind of verifi cation can be provided by means of DANE. 
Once again, the effectiveness of this technique is limited by the degree of deployment of the 
proposals. Certifi cate transparency can detect forged certifi cates issued by participating CAs 
but has none detection capabilities regarding non-participating CAs. This is an especially 
signifi cant limitation, since usually a server is not concerned about misissuance by its own CA, 
but about the others (see, for instance, the TURKTRUST case [5],), these others CAs are out 
of its control. Finally, there is an inherent limitation derived from the very nature of the PKI 
model. Since the security of the whole PKI is the security of the weakest CA, and that these 
weakest CAs are not likely to be part of this initiative, the expected security improvement 
cannot be very signifi cant.
There is a whole set of proposals that try to detect MITM attacks taking advantage from the 
fact that this kind of attacks are usually targeted attacks, rather than global scale attacks. This 
means that the attacker attempts to fool a specifi c target into believing the authenticity of the 
issued rogue certifi cate or key, while the rest of the Internet users are unaffected by the attack. 
Therefore, the victim will be receiving a certifi cate, which is different to the one seen by other 
Internet users. The Perspectives [13] and Convergence projects, in order to establish the validity 
of a received certifi cate, query designated nodes distributed over Internet, which act as notaries. 
A notary maintains a database of known server certifi cates. After the reception of a certifi cate 
by the client, she can check against the notary’s version and fl ag mismatches as possible attacks. 
Notaries introduce a reputation scheme into the standard validation process. 
Depending on the opinions received from these notaries, the certifi cate gets accepted or rejected. 
In practice, this voting scheme could be used to override the information used from the CA 
model. However, the client still has to trust these nodes (so they may become a point of failure 
if compromised), and there is a dependence on a pre-existing infrastructure. 
There are some interesting initiatives in the Internet for sensing and mining information about 
the existing certifi cates, which could be used to produce a more valuable evaluation of the 
validity of a certifi cate. The most prominent examples are the ICSI Certifi cate Notaries Service 
[14] and the EFF SSL Observatory [15]. The ICSI Certifi cate Notaries Service passively collects 
certifi cates at multiple independent Internet sites, aggregating them into a central database 
almost in real-time. The ICSI Notary provides a public DNS interface allowing a client to 
query its database with the SHA1 digest of a certifi cate that it would like to check. The currently 
inactive project Certifi cate Catalogue by Google offered a service quite similar to this. The idea 
of deploying a set of sensors to passively detecting certifi cates in transit in order to identify 
common and uncommon patterns is also one of the key points of our proposal but, in our case, 
the set of provided parameters is richer in order to be able to perform a multigroup classifi cation. 
Other initiatives like Crossbear or EFF SSL Observatory actively scan the Internet either by 
querying the TLS-enabled servers or asking the users to submit the certifi cates that they see.
215
The DetecTor Project [16] reuses the notary idea, but making every client to act as their own 
notary. To do this, the authors propose to use the Tor network to connect to the server under 
evaluation for the sole purpose of checking which certifi cate is seen when contacted from a 
different network location. This is essentially the same idea proposed in [17] but extended not 
only to HTTP but also to every protocol.
While the standardization work is progressing at a satisfactory speed, challenges remain. There 
is no common agreement of the design constraints and the types of threats that are supposed to 
be mitigated. The threat landscape is constantly evolving and an agreement about what threats 
need to be address does not exist. 
In order to be actually effective, a widespread deployment is required by all this initiatives. This 
deployment can imply client, server and additional infrastructures (e.g., DNS infrastructure for 
DANE or CAs for Certifi cate Transparency).
3. MIDAS: A DISTRIBUTED 
“PINNING-IN-THE-NET” APPROACH FOR 
AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE ASSESSMENT 
 
The aforementioned proposals offer only partial solutions to the certifi cate assessment problem. 
They usually require full deployment of the initiative (given the ‘weakest link in the chain’ 
property of PKI). Finally, pinning needs to be performed in a host-by-host basis, which is hardly 
scalable. 
This study proposes MIDAS (Man-in-the-middle Distributed Assessment System). MIDAS is an 
evolution from the pinning-in-the-host techniques to pinning-in-the-net techniques, by enabling 
mechanisms to validate certifi cates as they travel through a given network. Our idea is to classify 
certifi cates as trusted or not trusted as a result of cross-information obtained from different 
sources in an automated and distributed manner. While there have been some initiatives on 
using automated classifi cation techniques for certifi cate assessment in the Internet [18, 19], they 
usually require centralized analysis of massive amounts of training data to become effective. 
While this large corpus of data including both legitimate and rogue certifi cates can be assumed 
as available for the Internet scenario, it is hardly achievable in internal NATO networks, which 
are not only more reduced in size and traffi c, but also present a lower security incident rate than 
what we fi nd in open networks. In the following, we propose an approach to pin certifi cates as 
they pass through the network, which takes advantage of collective intelligence techniques and 
does not require extensive training data.
A. Environmental Assumptions
Our approach assumes an environment of a secure internal NATO network. This implies a 
number of network segments compartmentalized by a set of (physical or virtual) switches and 
routers. It also implies the existence of several network management infrastructure elements.
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As for the threat model, we assume an insider attack scenario, since attacks from the outside 
will usually be handled using other techniques. We will assume the attacking entity to be an 
individual node or group of nodes, which are in minority with respect to the total nodes in 
the network. We will also assume that the targets of the MITM attacks (that is, the client and 
server between which the attackers intend to place themselves at) have not been completely 
isolated by the attackers (that is, both client and server are able to send data to other hosts in the 
network). We will later discuss techniques to ensure that these assumptions hold.
B. System architecture
Our system uses a distributed variation of the typical Intrusion Detection System Architecture 
[20], which encompasses the following elements:
• A distributed information source, consisting of a set of network probes. In our 
system, eventually any network element or host can act as a probe.
• A distributed analysis engine, which relies on Bayesian Networks to evaluate trust 
relationships according to information about the certifi cates involved and network 
history.
• A distributed reaction component, which allows to effective alter network topology 
in real time to transparently counter man in the middle attacks, thus ensuring network 
and service operation.
FIGURE 1: DISTRIBUTED MIDAS ARCHITECTURE
In this section we briefl y outline each of these elements and their role in our proposal.
1) Network probes
As stated above, virtually any of the network elements within the communication infrastructure 
we want to secure may behave as a network probe. Basically, all that is needed is a network 
card that can act in promiscuous mode and capture packets from the network. Of course, such 
monitoring of traffi c may have a serious impact in the performance of conventional hosts, so 
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we do not expect that all hosts in the network will act as probes. However, we assume that 
there are a suffi cient number of probes distributed throughout the network. In particular, we 
rely on the existence of network management devices, which are specifi cally designed to be 
network probes. For instance, devices using NetFlow [21] or similar technologies for fl ow 
data analysis are especially suitable as probes in our system. These devices could, for instance, 
gather information about the TLS fl ows being established in the network, aggregating not only 
data about the certifi cates being used, but also the network path from source to destination or 
even the traffi c patterns observed (e.g. an asymmetric fl ow with 80% of the traffi c fl owing from 
server to client).
FIGURE 2: ARCHITECTURE OF MIDAS SYSTEM
2) Distributed analysis engine based on bayesian networks
The MIDAS analysis engine, again, relies on distribution. Any node in the network can act as 
an analyzer, provided that it has information to analyze. Therefore, the most usual scenario 
is that network probes themselves act as analyzers in the case of probes residing in hosts, 
whereas Netfl ow collectors or analysis consoles act as analyzers in the case of probes residing 
in network management elements. 
Analysis itself will be performed by using Bayesian Networks. A Bayesian network is a 
model that encodes probabilistic relationships among variables of interest. This technique is 
generally used for intrusion detection in combination with statistical schemes, a procedure that 
yields several advantages, including the capability of encoding interdependencies between 
variables and of predicting events, as well as the ability to incorporate both prior knowledge 
and data [22]. Each analyzer will have a built-in Bayesian network which is tailored to the 
specifi c scenario (given the usage model of the scenario), and which probability values are 
automatically adjusted during system life to adapt to the evolution of the network. The idea is 
that, for a given assessment query (e.g. “does this TLS handshake appear to be trustworthy?”), 
any analyzer can issue an assessment value which directly derives from the probabilities 
resulting from the network evaluation. Queries will typically occur when a given host needs to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of a given TLS exchange. The host will run an assessment using its 
own Bayesian network, and will also query a random set of nodes for their assessments on the 
validity of the same exchange. The host will then integrate all received values and its own to get 
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a fi nal assessment, and will use this assessment to decide whether to accept the TLS exchange 
as valid or to fl ag it as an intrusion. The fact that the set of analyzers is chosen randomly by the 
evaluating host will make it harder to manipulate the receiving assessments, provided that there 
are different network paths used in the communications between host and analyzers and that a 
majority of analyzers have not been compromised. 
Apart from assessments derived from queries, some of the analysis engines (typically, the ones 
in network management devices) will be entitled to provide automated detection. In this way, 
even if an assessment has not been requested on a given TLS exchange, a network element 
could fl ag it as anomalous (e.g. if a router captures a TLS fl ow with a certifi cate belonging to a 
server which is known to be in a different part of the network). This will allow also to react to 
events not directly related to certifi cate forging which could enable a MITM attack, such as the 
isolation of a given client or server.
3) Reaction subsystem based on SDN
From the information obtained from the aforementioned analysis, MIDAS will be able to 
automatically defi ne and put in place a restoring and reconfi guration plan of the network 
elements involved. This will allow, for instance, for traffi c to be rerouted via an alternative 
path avoiding the attacking nodes, or to isolate compromised network segments. The reaction 
subsystem will be designed and implemented according to the novel, emerging architectural 
model called SDN (Software Defi ned Networking) that separates the control plane from the 
data plane in network switches and routers. 
OpenFlow [23] is the fi rst standard communications interface defi ned between the control 
and forwarding layers of an SDN architecture. It provides a singular point of control over 
the network fl ow routing decisions across the data planes of all OpenFlow-enabled network 
components. Taking advantage of this, security app can implement complex quarantine 
procedures, or malicious connection migration functions that can redirect malicious network 
fl ows in ways not easily perceived by the fl ow participants. 
With SDN providing control over the forwarding, we can then isolate any malicious traffi c to the 
quarantined network while all other traffi c continues to operate as normal after being cleaned 
up. Upon detection of a potential attack, the traffi c is placed in an isolated network segment 
that closely monitors the activity giving the attacker the perception that they’re interacting with 
a real system when, in reality, it’s a system that records their actions, decisions, and reactions, 
giving insight into their methodology.
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FIGURE 3: LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE OF MIDAS SYSTEM
Although this component has not yet been implemented, similar approaches have shown its 
viability. In order to simplify the development and deployment process, we plan to use an 
approach similar to the FRESCO framework [24]. FRESCO is an OpenFlow security application 
development framework designed to facilitate the rapid design, and modular composition of 
OpenFlow-enabled detection and mitigation modules. Recently, the fi rst security enforcement 
kernel for the OpenFlow controller Floodlight [25] has been released. The combination of 
FRESCO framework and SE-Flodlight provides a reference framework to rapidly prototype 
and fi eld innovative security applications, which is makes it suitable for the kind of application 
that we want to develop. 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have introduced MIDAS, our proposal for a distributed certifi cate assessment 
system intended to thwart advanced Man-in-the-Middle attacks. This system builds on existing 
network monitoring and management technologies to provide a pinning-in-the-net approach 
enabling hosts to effectively assess the validity of the certifi cates they encounter during TLS 
interactions. The system relies on the existence of a set of network probes located in different 
elements of the network (either hosts or switches or routers), a distributed analysis engine based 
on bayesian networks and a reaction subsystem which makes use of SDN technologies.
Right now we have fully implemented the network probes and developed a proof-of-concept 
scenario of the complete architecture. Although the system looks promising, there is still 
considerable work to be done to build realistic Bayesian networks specifi cally tailored to realistic 
high-sensitive network scenarios.  This would result in early detection of suspicious certifi cates 
and would trigger mechanisms to defeat the attack, minimize its impact, and gather information 
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on the attackers. Additionally, a more detailed and thorough analysis could be performed. This 
would be achieved through the use of Software Defi ned Network (SDN) techniques, allowing 
a much more accurate and effi cient response to man-in-the-middle attacks, and mitigating 
damage in highly sensitive communication networks. 
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